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The major project for the course, Presidential Leadership, (History 317), in Spring Semester 2013, 
required the submission of a 15‐20 page seminar paper based on primary sources. My interest in 
constitutional history and, specifically, the balances of power among the three branches of the United 
States Government led me to examine the “advice and consent” doctrine in the U. S. Constitution, and 
how it pertained to the nomination and confirmation of justices to the Supreme Court. Shortly before 
the semester commenced, one of the most famous judges ever nominated for the Supreme Court, 
Robert H. Bork, died, and with his death came multiple news accounts of memories of the controversial 
hearings in 1987, and discussions of the lasting effects of what had become common lingo among 
politicos as the “Borking of Bork.” Pundits focused on how the confirmation process had deteriorated 
since Bork’s rejection in November of 1987. I decided to research primary sources, and back it up with 
academic scholarship to either confirm this contemporary theory or to argue in the opposite. 
 
I used many of WGR’s Library’s resources extensively in locating and retrieving both primary sources and 
academic monographs and scholarly journal articles focusing on this topic. From a historical standpoint, 
the sources ranged chronologically from the constitutional convention in 1787 all the way to a political 
science monograph published in 2009. Primary sources ran the gamut from founding fathers, James 
Madison and George Washington, to Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney, author of the Dred Scott 
opinion precipitating the Civil War, to Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Truman, Richard Nixon, 
and Ronald Reagan. Congressional hearings and other historical documents maintained by government 
departments throughout the three branches of government provided essential perspectives of how the 
country, and its government, has changed over the past 226 years. 
 
The research I gathered took several forms, from the constitutional convention hearings in 1787, and a 
separate diary account kept by Delegate Madison, to parts of the Federalist Papers used in the debates 
ratifying the U.S. Constitution forward to contemporary congressional and presidential documents. A 
significant aspect of my argument, that the Bork hearings were not substantially different in demeanor 
or conduct than prior controversial hearings, was aided greatly by access to a novel source for this 
student of history: I found 40 hours of videotape in C‐Span’s video library chronicling the Bork hearings 
from first gavel to the end of the testimony. These tapes gave a full public viewing of the respectful 
demeanor of all participants and also dissipated partisan criticisms during and after the process. 
 
The breadth and depth of my research, and the wide variety of the information that I was able to gather 
and analyze, kept my enthusiasm for the project very high from beginning to final submission. The 
resources and expertise of the WGR Library, including the helpful guidance of the librarians, played a 
central role in my ability to satisfactorily complete the project. 
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ADVICE OR CONSENT? 
 The U. S. Senate’s Role in Confirming Supreme Court Nominees 
and the Robert H. Bork Confirmation Hearing 
  
 Today’s common wisdom about the nomination and confirmation of justices to the U.S. Supreme 
Court presumes the process has deteriorated to an alarmingly dangerous state.  Political pundits as well 
as political science scholars have argued that Democratic members of the U. S Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary have effected a ‘sea-change’ in the advice and consent role of the Senate as found in Article 2, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. They argue that Senate Democrats have egregiously overstepped 
their bounds by their intense scrutiny of presidential nominees. To these commentators, the recent 
descent into the tendentious and sectarian confirmation hearings accelerated dramatically during the 
confirmation hearings of Judge Robert H. Bork in the fall of 1987. The ideological and highly partisan 
tactics employed by liberal Democratic senators during this process, they say, transformed what had 
been in the past a simple method for senate affirmation of the president’s selection: If the candidate was 
well-qualified and of sound character and mind, he/she would be a good match with the other ‘neutral 
arbiters of the law,’ already sitting on the bench. Instead, since Bork, the confirmation process has 
become, in their view, a dysfunctional spectacle in which judicial confirmations have been “held 
hostage” in the Senate.  They conclude that this battle between the executive and congressional branches 
of government has divided and weakened, and thereby threatened, the Republic. “The bottom has clearly 
fallen out of the confirmation process…” argue the authors of a 2009 book, Advice and Dissent.1  
 In sharp disparity with the ‘sea change’ argument, several legal scholars and historians have 
claimed that past confirmation hearings were at least as contentious as the Bork hearings. They maintain 
that intense probing into a Supreme Court nominee’s political ideology, legal philosophy, and personal 
beliefs has been a feature of the senate’s advice and consent role since early in the country’s history. 
Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee both before and after Bork have actively explored such 
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issues as judicial temperament, activism, past writings, speeches and opinions, all of which revealed a 
candidate’s interpretation of the Constitution.  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) remarked in 2002 that the 
Senate’s role in confirmations hearings was indeed, “…advise and consent. It isn’t advise and rubber 
stamp.”2  These scholars have typically ascribed a necessary and active role to the U.S. Senate in the 
confirmation process in contrast to those political analysts who blame a newly provocative senate.  
Legal and history scholars have effectively argued that “… ‘Advice’ was intended to be more than a 
redundant synonym for Consent (emphasis added.)’”3  These scholars concluded that the U.S. Senate’s 
role was to provide an additional check against the executive’s potential nomination of capricious, 
extreme, and ill-chosen candidates. The significance of this role became most evident when considering 
a lifetime appointment of a justice to the Court. Since most confirmed nominees would serve well 
beyond the terms of the presidents who appointed them, it was incumbent upon senators to address the 
confirmation process with a depth and seriousness that assured the true independence of the court.4 
 Primary resources in evaluating these two competing positions include debates over the roles of 
the executive and legislative branches during the Constitutional Convention held in Philadelphia from 
the end of May through much of September in 1787, and then the final wording of the U.S. Constitution 
itself. An analysis of the enumerated and un-enumerated rights articulated in the Bill of Rights, and the 
meaning of the words ‘advice and consent,’ found in Article II, Section 2,  shed light on those who have 
argued for a strict constructionist reading of the ‘original intent’ of the framers found within  the 
Constitution.  Those arguing against this highly limiting and strict reading see in these same words an 
expansive spirit, tone, and broad intent in the penumbra of the founding document.  
 Three areas of ideological inquiry were particularly contentious in the Bork hearings and will be 
the focus of this study. Equal Protection of the Law and Due Process of Law (habeas corpus), found in 
Amendment Fourteen, Section 1 (with the due process clause also enumerated in Amendment Five of 
the Bill of Rights) comprised an important area of exploration. A second debate concerned ‘privacy 
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rights’ of individuals. These two words are not connected in the wording of the Constitution, but the 
concept has evolved over time as various courts found rights, interpreted from the Ninth and Fourteenth 
Amendments which bolstered the protection of an individual citizen against the colossal power of the 
state.  The third issue, civil rights, encompassed many of the issues above, with the addition of civil 
rights legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  
 Other essential sources in investigating the debate include the contemporaneous statements and 
speeches made by President Ronald Reagan in support of Judge Bork’s nomination before, during, and 
following the Bork affair. Reagan’s speeches and remarks provided ample delineations of his 
understanding of the confirmation process and of the role of the Supreme Court in contemporary society. 
Another key player supporting the president’s nominee in the Senate was James “Strom” Thurmond (R-
SC), who was the ranking member of the Republican Party on the Committee during the Bork hearings. 
The committee hearings and debate evinced Senator Thurmond’s position as to Judge Bork’s 
qualifications, and his views of the unfair slander and misrepresentations of Democratic senators 
challenging the judge’s record on equal protection, due process, and civil rights. 
 In contrast, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden (D-DE), joined with his 
Democratic colleagues in articulating a very different theory of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. 
This paper will scrutinize the questions and statements made by Senator Biden and his colleagues, and 
several of his colleagues on the committee, specifically relating to the three major issues delineated 
above. Both the court hearings and the Senate debate will be used to piece together these arguments in 
opposition to the president’s nominee. The hearings themselves were videotaped and are available on-
line at C-Span.org.5 The Senate debate that followed the hearings is available from congressional 
records of the period.6   
 Through this analysis of the various statements, speeches, written transcripts, and forty hours of 
television coverage of the hearings and debate over the three key issues, the study will determine if the 
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Bork hearings were a radical departure from the ‘normal’ (historical) confirmation process before Bork, 
or if the nature of the debate was consistent with other contentious confirmation proceedings.  Applying 
various political and legal opinions to the Bork confirmation process, can demonstrate whether this 
controversial event had a transformative effect resulting in a major power shift from the executive 
branch to the senate. Were the statements made by President Reagan or the conduct of those senate 
committee members opposing the nominee truly notorious?  If so, was the Bork confirmation process so 
thoroughly damaging, as some argue, that the laws of the Republic (and, accordingly, the U.S. 
Constitution) were endangered by the liberal Senate Democrats’ ‘left-wing’ power grab? 
Part 1 – The Arguments 
 In “The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees,” authors Lee 
Epstein, René Lindstädt, Jeffrey A., Segal, and Chad Westerland argued that a “near universal 
consensus” existed that the Bork nomination sparked a regime change in the U.S. Senate. From 1987 on, 
senators interrogating Supreme Court nominees relegated the traditional (and formerly central, so they 
argued) considerations of competence and integrity to a lesser role, in favor of a new and transformative 
emphasis on politics, ideology and judicial philosophy.7 To prove this thesis, they updated a statistical 
model (the Cameron, Cover and Segal model published in 1990, known as the CCS) evaluating the 
relative effects of ideology and legal qualifications on nominee confirmation voting behavior from 1937 
– 2005.  They invented two independent variables – measuring a senator’s view of the legal competency 
of the candidate and, more importantly, a measure of the candidate’s “ideological distance” from the 
senator. The dependent variable in the study was defined as the yea or nay vote on each candidate.  If a 
qualified candidate’s ideological ranking was “sufficiently proximate to the senator’s,” the nominee had 
a better chance of earning the senator’s vote. Applying these tools to the analysis of 3,709 votes from 
1936 – 2005, the authors concluded that senatorial tolerance towards voting for those candidates who 
may be well-qualified, yet are perceived to have wide ideological gulfs, had declined significantly 
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following the Bork hearings. 8 In what they referred to as the “Bork Effect,” they reported that an 
additional emphasis on ideological compatibility between senators and candidates had a large 
substantive impact: “…the president’s discretion over whom to nominate to the Supreme Court has 
grown far more circumscribed over the last two decades.” 9 They concurred with other political pundits 
and scholars who argued that the dynamics of senate confirmation hearings post-Bork transformed the 
traditional power balance from the executive to the legislative branch in the Supreme Court confirmation 
game. 
 In a similar vein, a 2004 article published in the Journal of Politics by Timothy Johnson and 
Jason Roberts, political scientists at the University of Minnesota, agreed with the findings of the 
“Changing Dynamics” article.  They noted an upsurge, since the Bork event, in an ideologically 
“seismic struggle,” between the executive and the legislature over appointments to the Supreme Court. 
They maintained that these disputes were triggered by the perceived significance of the results: each side 
believed it should play the decisive role in the process.   In this “winner-take-all” contest, both sides 
risked the political power each needed to successfully control public and legislative agendas and thereby 
chalk up votes in the next election cycle.10 President Richard Nixon, for example, was well-known for 
his passionate stance against senate interference with his Supreme Court nominees. As he wrote: “If the 
senate attempts to substitute its judgment as to who should be appointed, the traditional constitutional 
balance is in jeopardy and the duty of the president under the Constitution is impaired.”11   Johnson and 
Roberts examined the effectiveness of those presidents who expended political capital to bring about a 
favorable vote on their most highly valued nominees. They defined the presidential investment of 
political power during the process as “going public” – and counted the number and types of comments 
presidents made to bolster their candidate’s chances for approval in the senate. They distinguished 
among three types of statements: those endorsing strong legal qualifications, those which called upon 
the public to vocally support the president’s choice, by contacting their representatives in the senate, and 
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those intended to pressure the senate to acquiesce to the president’s nomination.  Their methodology 
relied upon previous statistical models such as the CCS and the updated model used in the article by 
Epstein, Lindstädt, Segal and Westerland, and added a raw count of the frequency of each type of 
presidential statement extending from the nomination of Justice Tom C. Clark by President Truman in 
1949, to President Clinton’s successful nomination of Justice Stephen Bryer in 1994.12 They were able 
to conclude, with one extraordinary caveat described below, that the expenditure of political currency by 
presidents on valued candidates had been successful over time in at least reducing the number of “no” 
votes in the senate. 13 
  The exceptional caveat affecting the conclusions reached by Johnson and Roberts is particularly 
relevant to this examination of the Bork hearings, and in this context, more significant than their general 
findings.  While examining the results of the statistical models, the scholars discovered a stunning 
“outlier” in the data. The number of presidential statements by Reagan on behalf of Bork’s nomination 
represented 32% of all statements made by all presidents in support of all Supreme Court candidates 
during the study period. The number of statements Reagan made which were characterized as applying 
pressure on the senate was a whopping 46% of the total in that specific category.14  Reagan expended 
much more political capital on Bork, ultimately in a losing cause, than any other president during a time-
frame spanning forty-five years. This period included such contentious hearings as those of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall (1967), Judge G. Harrold Carswell (1970); the elevation of Judge Rehnquist to the 
position of Chief Justice (1986) and Justice Clarence Thomas (1991).  Clearly President Reagan 
invested heavily in his attempts to affect the confirmation of his most highly-prized Supreme Court 
candidate, Judge Bork. 
 Using a different approach, journalist and self-appointed political pundit, Patrick B. McGuigan, 
concluded in his 1990 book, Ninth Justice: The Fight for Bork, “The liars got their way on this one.” 15 
While congratulating President Reagan on his triumph in “placing” (court-packing?) four candidates on 
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the Court during his first term in office, McGuigan lamented the results of the 1986 mid-term elections, 
in which the Democrats dangerously “seized control of the upper chamber,” as well as the Judiciary 
Committee. He also bemoaned the way that Chairman Biden “thrust himself into the media spotlight by 
threatening that a conservative nominee would be in for, ‘big trouble.”16  An alternate version of this 
story had President Reagan inviting senior members of the Judiciary Committee to the White House to 
discuss potential nominees the weekend before his selection of Bork. In this account, Senator Biden was 
quoted as saying in a personal comment to the president that “big trouble” would result if Judge Bork 
was put forth. Biden released a statement on 26 June 1987 in which he affirmed that, “the nomination 
could turn on whether Powell's replacement ‘would alter the balance of the court’ and that he [Biden] 
would ‘resist any efforts by this administration to do indirectly what it has failed to do in the Congress -- 
and that is impose an ideological agenda upon our jurisprudence.’”17 While McGuigan cites an article in 
the Washington Post, regarding his argument that Biden was politically-motived to attack the nominee, 
that citation referring a media blitz by Biden was not confirmed in the senator’s public statements or 
remarks prior to Reagan’s announcement on 2 July 1987. In his opening statement at the beginning of 
the hearings on September 15, 1987, Chairman Biden confirmed the latter account when he remarked 
that, “As I made clear to the White House and the Attorney General prior to your selection, and as I told 
you privately, Judge Bork, as a matter of principle, I was and continue to be deeply troubled by some of 
your views. It would be less than honest, then or now, to pretend otherwise. (emphasis added)”18 
 McGuigan blamed the shoddy mistreatment of Judge Bork by senate Democrats, which he 
labeled as “mud-slinging,” as a politically-motivated tactic to pander to special interest groups opposed 
to Bork. McGuigan also argued that the many “libelous” distortions of Bork’s record by senators, and 
the pressure from these same special interests were responsible for the eventual failure of Bork’s 
confirmation.  He added that his “side” in the political spectrum was not prepared to wage that fight at 
that point in time, further contributing to the sad outcome.19 Finally, he accused liberals of successfully 
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devising and employing “techniques for effective distortion…” The Democrats had been at it – 
collecting information on potential justices and devising strategies for blocking candidates – decades 
before the Republicans learned how to organize themselves into such an efficient politically effective 
engine.20 McGuigan characterized the period following Justice Powell’s resignation in June 1987 to 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s elevation to the Court in 1988 as “one of the most tragic eras in American 
history.”21  
 A contemporary of MacGuigan, Henry Paul Monaghan, the Harlan F. Stone Constitutional Law 
Professor at Columbia University, testified on behalf of Bork’s confirmation in September 1987. He 
commented on the judge’s “surpassing qualifications” for the bench. He argued at the time that the 
Senate had a constitutional imperative to affirm the president’s nominee based on Bork’s superior 
intelligence and preparation.  Not quite six months later, however, the professor published an article in 
the Harvard Law Review questioning and reflecting upon his testimony in favor of Bork. He re-
examined and questioned his assumptions during the process.  To his surprise he found, “that no such 
argument is possible.”22  He found that Supreme Court confirmation hearings had been contentious all 
the way back to President Washington’s appointment of Judge Rutledge to succeed Chief Justice John 
Jay in 1795. Throughout the 19th Century presidential nominees had been rejected or delayed for a 
surprising variety of reasons including oppositional political views, the application of “senatorial 
courtesy,” and the lame-duck tactic of holding on to vacant seats until the next administration took 
over.23 Monaghan described the profound impact on the federal government of the growth and 
increasing diversity of the country during the nineteenth century - different regions, differing opinions, 
competing economic systems, slavery and reconstruction, the formation of two major political parties, 
immigrants and, in response, the “no-nothings. All of these trends had a great impact on the federal 
government. As a result of this diversity, senators rightly interrogated court nominees on their personal 
beliefs, judicial ideologies and partisan political considerations. 24 
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 In stark contrast to the views expressed in Advise & Dissent, Monaghan saw his version of a ‘sea 
change,’ in the Senate’s diminishing role from the late 19th Century and through most of the 20th 
Century, as the executive branch expanded its power and control at the expense of the other two 
branches of government.  By the time of the New Deal, governmental power had successfully shifted 
from congress to the president. It became the executive’s prerogative to shape society, as well as the 
Supreme Court. Monaghan maintained that the consolidated power of the modern executive branch had 
enormous resources to garner support for a candidate, as well as power to discipline errant senators or, 
in return for political favors, nurture political operatives with perquisites that the Congress itself could 
not convey. 25 In his analysis and reflection, Monaghan could find “no significant affirmative 
constitutional compulsion [directing the Senate]…to confirm any presidential nominee.” As such, 
Senators were free to engage in any course of interrogation they deemed relevant and, as representatives 
of the people, were duty-bound to accept this heightened responsibility as a crucial check on executive 
power. Only they could assure that a justice’s opinions would align, at least to a certain degree, with the 
people’s representatives in Congress and thus more closely match the people’s needs and interests.26 
 Political scientists Jeff Yates and William Gillespie found two major historical views represented 
in the advice and consent debate.  In the first, the role of the Senate was limited in scope, focusing on 
qualifications and aspects of the candidate’s character, and definitely avoiding any political or 
ideological questions on issues which potential justices might face on the Court. The second opinion 
more closely matched that espoused by Professor Monaghan. Confirmation votes should rest on a broad 
scope of inquiry into the relative compatibility of the candidates’ political and ideological positions with 
those settled laws providing, for example, an expansion of the equal protection, due process, and civil 
rights in society.27 
 Addressing the first view, arguing for a limited scope of inquiry, scholar Jeffrey K. Tullis argued 
that if senators avoided an in-depth dialogue with candidates on political and ideological questions it 
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would be akin to forcing sitting justices who have written precedent-setting opinions to recuse 
themselves from voting on similar cases in the future.28 The sensible argument articulated here is that 
people develop their thoughts, beliefs, political affiliations, and ideologies over lifetimes of experience 
and reflection. To expect potential justices of the Supreme Court to leave these comprehensive identities 
at the door to the court room was not only un-realistic but also undesirable. In 1991 for example, many 
Americans were uncomfortable with the notion that a judge such as Supreme Court nominee Clarence 
Thomas, who was in law school during the Roe v. Wade debates in the Court, did not form any opinion, 
or any theory, or have any discussions about the case while he was studying the law. Even an immature 
and unsophisticated understanding of the issues at hand would have been much more readily accepted 
by Americans than none at all. Yet during the confirmation hearings Thomas emphatically denied ever 
forming an express opinion on the ruling, much less conversing with anyone - legal colleagues, 
politicians, his family or acquaintances - from the original date of the ruling in 1973 through the fall of 
1991.  
 
Part 2 - The Constitutional Debate 
 The initial debates about placing judges on the Supreme Court occurred during the Constitutional 
Convention held in Philadelphia from May 25 to September 17, 1787, and from the beginning the 
discussions were contentious. One side of the debate favored a strong executive while others had more 
faith in legislative bodies. These two arguments were mirrored along the same lines of debate at the 
Bork hearings 200 years later.  On May 29th, 1787, Charles Pinckney (a convention delegate from South 
Carolina) put forth a draft of a proposed Constitution which contained the following provision: 
The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive power to declare war; and to make treaties; and to 
appoint ambassadors and other ministers to foreign nations and judges of the Supreme Court. 29  
 
This particular provision led to a variety of revisions, none of which gained sufficient support, and thus 
the issue was tabled until a later date, as was common for many provisions in various drafts. In July, 
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James Madison, representative from Virginia, proposed that the executive have the power to nominate 
judges who would be appointed to the court, unless two-thirds of the “second house” voted in opposition 
to the nominee thereby resulting in a concurrence between the legislative and executive branches.30 
Pinckney disagreed, arguing that the senate should make the decision because the executive was not 
equipped with the requisite knowledge of all of potentially qualified nominees.  Representing 
Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth favored nomination by the senate and confirmation by the executive, 
which could be overridden by two-thirds of the senate. Representative Gouveneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania countered that the executive would be in the best position of identifying qualified 
individuals for the court. Morris argued that “If the Executive can be safely trusted with the command of 
the army there can not [sic] surely be any reasonable ground of jealousy [by the people’s 
representatives] in the present case.”31  When Madison was challenged for requiring two-thirds 
ratification by the senate, he not only easily compromised on this provision, but went further to assert 
that the supreme court and the executive branches should together have the power to review, revise, and 
edit any law passed by the congress  before it became settled law.32 The lengthy and sometimes 
contentious deliberations reflected contemporaneous understandings of political theory and the nature of 
power.  As was expected, the delegates divided into two broad groups: those who were wary of the 
potential abuses of executive power, and those who considered legislative bodies “cabal-like” cauldrons 
promoting parochial self-interests.33 
 On September 3, 1787, the language which is found in Article II, Section 2 of the approved 
Constitution was proposed, “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate…shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme  
[sic] Court …”34 This approved wording, however did not end the debate.  During the ratification 
process of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton joined the debate over Supreme Court nominations 
History – Presidential Leadership 
Dr. Peter F. Coogan 
Marjory B. O’Leary 
13-May-2013 | Page 12 of 36 
writing as Publius in The Federalist Papers. He clarified, in paper number 66, his view of the respective 
roles of the executive and legislative branches when he wrote,  
There will, of course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They may defeat one 
choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves 
CHOOSE… it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other 
complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might 
inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy…So far as might concern the misbehavior of the 
Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate, we need not be 
apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or 
to vindicate their own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon their 
virtue.35 
 
 By theorizing that Senators would be content with executive power controlling the decision, and 
that a self-righteous senate would organically reject any presidential abuse of power, Hamilton did not 
foresee the ideological and political splits between these two branches of government in determining 
who should serve on the third.  By placing his faith in the power of a president, Hamilton assumed that 
an enhanced sense of duty and obligation was necessarily intrinsic in the executive branch. The highest 
ruler in the land, this sovereign, would not fall victim to distractions of competing factions or the 
diversity of opinions found in an assembly of politicians. In Hamilton’s optimistic view, the president 
would focus simply on the merits of the individual and his ability to contribute to the common good by 
upholding and enforcing the rule of law in society.36 The notion of ‘public virtue’ held important 
currency among the founding fathers in the 18th Century and Hamilton found that virtue in the duly 
elected president  He agreed with Madison’s concept that, by gaining concurrence of the Senate on 
Supreme Court nominees, the legitimacy of the executive’s decision would be enhanced. (Although in 
his view the senate’s consent would be silent). Hamilton could not imagine a situation in which a 
president would subvert constitutional imperatives in an attempt to “pack” the Supreme Court with those 
justices whose radical political philosophies (right wing or left wing) mirrored his own. Nor was he able 
to imagine a president who flagrantly disregarded the rule of law and placed himself above it.  Madison, 
conversely, was neither highly confident nor sufficiently optimistic to assume that the executive branch 
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would not devolve into the same type of absolutist monarchy as did the one ruled by King George III. 
The genius of Madison’s contributions to the Constitution that resulted in numerous checks and 
equalizing balances sprung from his pessimistic view of human nature in its struggle between public 
virtue and personal vice.  
 
Part 3 – Historical Precedents 
 “Advice and consent” was clearly identified throughout U. S. history as a specifically assigned, 
positive responsibility of the senate in approving Supreme Court nominees, and was clearly understood 
by the founding fathers, authors of the Constitution, and the judicial branch of the newly formed 
Supreme Court.  The first challenge to a president’s nomination began in June 1795 when President 
Washington made a recess appointment of John Rutledge of South Carolina as chief justice of the court 
upon the retirement of John Jay.  Weeks after the appointment, Rutledge committed a critical political 
faux pas by delivering an ill-timed speech in August declaring his vehement opposition to the Jay 
Treaty. Rutledge failed to consider the political fallout that would swirl around his nomination since the 
president firmly supported the treaty, and it had also earned the consent of the legislature.  When the 
senate convened to consider Rutledge’s nomination, senators weighed not only Rutledge’s legal 
qualifications, but also his political opinions. The Federalist-controlled senate challenged Rutledge’s 
political judgment in both opposing the treaty (some even questioned his mental stability in taking this 
position), and in choosing to publicly reveal his position before the confirmation hearings began.  
Rutledge was rejected in December 1795.37 
 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Roger Taney (1836-1864), notorious for his opinion in the 
Dred Scott case in 1857, clearly understood how political considerations were essential in seating 
justices on the court. He contended that politicians and legal scholars were wrong when they argued 
“…no consideration should be given to the views of the appointee on the subject of politics, taking 
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politics in its highest and philosophical sense as involving theories of human rights and the principles of 
government.”38  Political considerations assured diversity on the court so that a variety of philosophies 
and opinions would be considered in the court’s deliberations. If both the president and a majority of 
Supreme Court justices shared the same political and ideological affinities, it would result in a 
diminishing role of the legislative branch making the government vulnerable to tyranny.  Even President 
Theodore Roosevelt of “bully pulpit” fame, one of the earliest presidents who, primarily through foreign 
exploits and commitments, expanded and strengthened the role of the executive in relation to congress, 
modestly wrote in his Autobiography, “I was only one-half the appointing power…I nominated; but the 
Senate confirmed.”39 In 1959, William Rehnquist wrote an article published in the Harvard Law Review 
in which he stressed the imperative of senate inquiry into the political, legal, and constitutional 
philosophies when interrogating supreme court nominees.  
Until the Senate restores its practice of thoroughly informing itself of the judicial philosophy of a Supreme Court 
nominee before voting to confirm him, it will have a hard time convincing doubters that it could make effective use 
of any additional part in the selection process.40 
 
In this article Rehnquist criticized the judiciary committee for failing to ask pertinent and probative 
questions of recent supreme court nominees. He bemoaned the troubling lack of rigorous investigation 
of the political opinions and judicial philosophy of candidates, or even a comprehensive analysis of 
previous opinions and other writings available to the senators on the committee. Rehnquist may have 
rued the day he wrote this article. Twenty-seven years later, in 1986, he was thrust into a highly 
contentious and divisive confirmation hearing when Reagan appointed him as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court to replace Chief Justice Warren Burger. Rehnquist was harangued with relentless 
questioning over his pro-segregationist beliefs and in particular, a memo he wrote in 1952 as a legal 
clerk to Justice Robert Jackson, providing the justice with a rationale to rule in opposition to the Brown 
v. Board de-segregation case.  Similar questions dogged Rehnquist’s original confirmation battle to the 
high court in 1971, but some writers, including the Nixon White House’s former councilor, John Dean, 
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argued that Rehnquist committed flat-out perjury during the 1986 hearings as a way to gain the 
appointment as chief justice and escape his controversial past.41 
 
Part Four – Thurgood Marshall’s Confirmation Hearing 
 Twenty years before the Bork hearings, another judge was nominated to the high court by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, who publicly announced his nominee on June 13, 1967. Thurgood 
Marshall had a long, storied, and very successful career in civil rights law, followed by government 
service as a judge on the U. S. Court of Appeals, and then as Solicitor General of the U.S. He was the 
first person of African American heritage to be elevated to this high position in government. In this role 
Marshall won 14 of the 19 cases (74%) he argued on behalf of the U.S. Government. Upon his 
nomination in 1967, the American Bar Association gave its highest rating to Judge Marshall’s 
candidacy, and several lawyers, legal scholars, and politicians supported him during the hearings. As 
with the Bork hearings, senators on the committee had more than ample time to examine Marshall’s 
writings, opinions, political beliefs, judicial philosophy, and his private background. One of the 
committee members, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) (who also sat on the committee during the Bork 
process) asked J. Edgar Hoover to have the FBI delve into Judge Marshall’s past to trying to find 
communist ties. The irony here is that of all African American leaders in the Civil Rights movement, 
Judge Marshall’s arguments for equality were based on his faith and his application of the power of the 
U.S. Constitution on crucial legal issues. 
 During the course of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, many highly contentious, probative, 
and at times disrespectful, interrogations of the nominee ensued. The hearings were dominated by three 
powerful segregationist and conservative senators from the South: James. O. Eastland (D-MS), chair of 
the committee, Samuel Ervin, Jr. (D-NC), and Strom Thurmond (R-SC), each of whom opposed the 
candidate’s ascendancy to the high court. Senator Ervin’s line of attack was the recently decided 
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Miranda cases and the potentially alarming impact on the criminal justice system he perceived would 
follow. Senator Eastland allotted his time to question Marshall on the judge’s political views, while 
Senator Thurmond’s interrogation was comprised of a tedious examination of the origins of the 13th and 
14th amendments to the Constitution. 
 Ervin’s first line of inquiry, although lightly veiled in hypothetical and remotely historical terms, 
was directed towards the Miranda rulings of 1966 which expanded rights provided in the fifth 
amendment protecting individuals from self-incrimination when accused of a crime. Elements of this 
law also broadened the interpretation of the 14th Amendment’s “equal protection clause,” by promising 
legal representation to those indicted individuals who could not afford to hire a lawyer. Ervin prefaced 
his interrogatory by stating his firmly held belief that the Constitution imposed upon the senate the duty 
to determine the constitutional philosophy of the nominee. He lectured Marshall on the evils which had 
arisen in recent years from judicial activism and failures to adhere to the “original intent” of the 
framers.42  Marshall politely challenged Ervin’s argument by countering that in his belief, the 
Constitution was a living document.  Marshall found this definition from court opinions originally 
written in the 1880’s which further articulated the framers’ intentions as “a living document to be 
interpreted and applied as of the time that a particular factual situation came up.”  It was written 
precisely with broad strokes in order to account for societal and governmental changes over history: 
“You can’t expect the court to apply the Constitution to facts in 1967 that weren’t in existence when the 
Constitution was drafted,” Marshall remarked.43  
 In terms of the Miranda cases, Ervin held that the 5th amendment referred only to self-
incriminating statements occurring during a court case itself, while voluntary comments before and 
during the criminal or civil proceedings were not protected by the Constitution. Marshall pointed out 
that this issue pivoted on the concept of a “voluntary” confession: “I tried a case in Oklahoma where the 
man ‘voluntarily’ confessed after he was beaten up for 6 days. He ‘voluntarily’ confessed.” Marshall 
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further explained that these types of distinctions, while not defined in the Constitution, were those that 
judges most often faced, and thus the amendment should be interpreted in light of the facts in any 
specific situation.  Decisions by judges must be made not only based on the words in the amendment, 
but also considering each case by itself, reviewing precedents that may pertain to the case.44 Ervin 
continued to press his case for judicial restraint and he asked Marshall to take a public stand on 
Miranda-based cases that would likely come before the Supreme Court in the future. Marshall did not 
take the bait. He patiently explained that if he did make such a statement, he would be obligated to 
recuse himself from those cases. The following exchange ensued:  
Ervin: If you have no opinions on what the Constitution means at this time, you ought not be confirmed…How can 
this committee or how can the Senate perform its duty and ascertain what your constitutional or judicial philosophy 
is without ascertaining what you think about the Constitution? 
 
Marshall: Well, one way, you can look at my opinions. 
 
Ervin: I know, but I do not have the time to read all of your opinions… I note that one of them is fifteen pages 
long!..Judge, how can the words, “no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself,” apply to anything except testimony given in a court? 
 
Marshall:  I would say, Senator, that we know, you and I that you are talking about a matter which was in the 
Miranda cases, and there will be many more cases dealing with the Miranda rule and the use of confessions… 
 
Ervin: I will ask you if every one of those cases which were litigated before the Supreme Court of the United States 
from June 15, 1790 down to the 13th day of June 1966 did not hold that these words had no possible application to 
voluntary confessions made outside of the court? 
 
Marshall: For the same reason I cannot answer that question. 45 
 
Despite the clarity of Marshall’s response to this line of inquiry, as well as his suggestion that the 
Senator from North Carolina (or members of his staff) could easily review the judge’s earlier opinions 
and rulings, Ervin continued to ask badgering questions of the Judge pertaining to the Miranda issue, 
and inserted overt criticisms of Marshall’s refusal to respond to his questions:  
Frankly, I am sorry that this nominee will not do as all of us enjoy doing, speak for himself. I am disappointed that 
the nominee has  a reluctance, and I believe I could even go far enough as to characterize it as an unwillingness, to 
answer any questions concerning the meaning of the Constitution which would reveal to the members of this 
committee and Senate what his constitutional or judicial philosophy is.46 
 
Ervin finished this area of questioning with a speech condemning those sitting justices who voted to 
uphold Miranda. He accused the justices of adding a clause to the language of the 5th amendment that 
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went far beyond original intent. The ramifications of this decision, in Ervin’s view, forever disrupted the 
res judicata tradition of finding a final resolution in criminal cases, not subject to appeal in the future.47 
 Senator Eastland’s politically-driven questions were very brief and yet demonstrated his efforts 
to portray Marshall as a threat, indeed even a potential enemy of the state for his liberal (and perhaps 
communist?) beliefs at a highly significant and sensitive period in U.S. history. The following dialogue 
is typical of the exchange between the two: 
Chairman [Eastland]: Do you think the Supreme Court is an instrument of social change? 
 
Marshall:  Do I think that the Supreme Court is undergoing a social change? No. Sir 
 
Chairman: And you don’t think that a judge, a Justice of the Supreme Court, should be controlled by his own 
personal opinions…in rendering a decision? 
 
Marshall:  I don’t think any judicial officer should be… 
 
Chairman: Vol. 11, No. 5, dated May 15, 1966 [of the American Bar News], gives some quotations from you at a 
speech at the University of Miami on Law Day, 1966. …You are quoted in this article as having said that your 
concern was not with those ‘who resist any change in the status quo with fury,’ but those ‘whose criticism of recent 
Supreme Court doctrine stems from a more intellectual level.’ You are quoted as having stated that this, ‘intellectual 
or professional criticism reflects a profound element of misunderstanding. It reflects a refusal to accept a new 
concept of law, to shake free of the 19th century moorings and to view law, not as a set of abstract and socially 
unrelated commands of the sovereign, but as effective instruments of social policy.’” 
 
Chairman …Well, then, doesn’t that reflect that – isn’t the meaning of that that the U.S. Supreme Court is an 
instrument and should be an instrument of social change? 
 
Marshall: I don’t think I was talking about the Supreme Court. I was talking about the people in general and 
especially the bar.48 
 
 Eastland finished his line of investigation with questions about a dissenting opinion that 
Marshall had written in People of New York v. Galamison Et Al, (May 1964) in which Marshall 
stated, “First, peaceful protest, speech and petition, is a form of self-help not unknown during the 
era of Reconstruction.” This case involved a picket line at the Downstate Medical Center in 
Brooklyn, NY in 1963 by African American laborers who were demonstrating against unlawful 
and discriminating hiring practices by trade unions and building contractors. The defendants in 
this case were the demonstrators who were accused of disorderly conduct and resisting a public 
officer. These defendants were pleading with the court to relieve them of criminal prosecution. 
While the majority opinion expressed sympathy for the workers, it also said: “this [the court] is 
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not the proper forum to urge these matters; nor is the loftiness of defendants' motives or the 
justice of their cause before the court on this motion, however much the court may sympathize 
with and respect the rights of aggrieved minorities to seek and obtain full civil rights and equal 
employment opportunities.” the defendants were obviously not granted the relief from criminal 
prosecution.49 Eastland asked Marshall during this discussion if Marshall quoted from a specific 
book in his opinion against the ruling, and this discourse ensued: 
Chairman: Did you cite a book…by a man named Aptheker, A Documentary History of the Negro 
People in the United States? 
 
Marshall: I think I did. 
 
Chairman: Well, now, of course, I don’t want to leave the impression that you have ever been a 
Communist or anything like that, but did you know that at the time you cited this work the author 
of the book, Herbert Aptheker, had been for many years an avowed Communist and was the 
leading Communist theoretician in the United States (emphasis added)? 
 
Marshall:  I positively did not know that.50 
 
Eastland’s area of inquiry during this exchange was clearly intended to cast a shadow over Marshall’s 
candidacy, by bringing up the specter of communism in 1967. Even though the red-bashing of the 
1950’s in the U.S. had receded, the Cold War struggle between the U.S. and the U.SS.R. permeated 
American society and culture in 1967. 
 Thurmond’s interrogation of Marshall took several days and was almost exclusively focused on 
attempting to demonstrate the nominee’s lack of qualifications and his lack of knowledge of 
constitutional law, and in particular’s an area of expertise – the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.  
Only a few examples of this dialogue are needed to show Thurmond’s tactics as well as his disdain for 
the candidate and his qualifications for the high court. Thurmond began by asserting his belief that the 
candidate should, naturally, be an expert on these two civil rights amendments, and as such, Marshall 
should be able to answer arcane, and in many cases obscure questions: 
Thurmond: Turning to the provision of the 13th amendment forbidding involuntary servitude, are you familiar with 
any pre-1860 cases which interpreted this language? 
 
Marshall: Well, Senator, I might say, frankly, I don’t know of any case I had that involved the 13th amendment. My 
research on it would be very limited, on the 13th amendment. 
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Thurmond: Does the provision against involuntary servitude, in your view, abolish all compulsory labor for the 
benefit of a private person, and if not, what limitations would you read into this language and on what legal basis 
would you establish such limitation? 
 
Marshall: If such a question came before me, I would research the background of the 13th amendment, and apply it 
to the facts. I haven’t had the opportunity to do that. 
 
Thurmond: Do you agree with the article………that the provision against involuntary servitude in the 13th 
amendment prevents either Federal or State legislation which requires any person to render personal services to any 
other private person, whether the refusal to render such services is motivated by racial or religious discrimination or 
for any other reason, and if you do not agree with this view, why do you  think that the provisions against 
involuntary servitude does not forbid legislation requiring personal services? 
 
Marshall:  I am not familiar with the article, and I am not at this time ready to given an opinion because I haven’t 
researched it. 
 
Thurmond: What kind of legislation would, in your estimation, be forbidden by the provision against involuntary 
servitude? 51 
 
 Turning to the fourteenth amendment, an arrogant Thurmond scornfully upbraided the candidate, 
and reacted sarcastically towards a fellow committee member, for their lack of brilliance on a key 
constitutional point. 
Thurmond:  What constitutional difficulties did Representative John Bingham of Ohio see, or what difficulties do 
you see, in congressional enforcement of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, through the 
necessary and proper clause of article 1, section 8? 
 
Marshall:  I don’t understand the question. 
 
Thurmond:  What constitutional difficulties did Representative John Bingham of Ohio see, or what difficulties do 
you see, in congressional enforcement of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, through the 
necessary and proper clause of article 1, section 8? 
 
Marshall: I don’t see that any … 
 
Senator E. Kennedy: Could we just have some further clarification so all of us can benefit? I really don’t understand 
the question myself. I was just wondering if the Senator, so we could all benefit from both the question and 
response…. 
 
Thurmond:  Well, I repeated the question twice. Would you like me to repeat it again? 
 
Kennedy: I thought that rather than repeating the question maybe there was some other way that you could arrive at 
it. 
 
Thurmond: I don’t think I can make it any plainer, if you know the answer. 
 
Kennedy – I see. 
 
Thurmond – It is just a question of whether you know the answer. 
 
Kennedy: I see. Could you tell us how the Solicitor is… 
 
Thurmond:  Well, I could tell you that article IV, section 2, did not set forth the powers vested in the United States. 
That’s the answer.52 
 
The question which seemed to be obscure enough, was also intended to trick the candidate into an 
incorrect response.  
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 The last thing that Eastland, Ervin, and Thurmond wanted in 1967 was an anti-segregation 
justice on the Supreme Court. The hearing occurred in the middle of the civil rights movement and the  
challenges and the tensions attending to the violence of whites against peaceful black protestors. 
Criticisms of Johnson’s nomination of Thurgood Marshall were rife throughout the media. Marshall was 
criticized as being easy on crime and criminals, a leftist-leaning liberal in his politics, not a particularly 
distinguished legal scholar, and unwilling to reveal his position on issues likely to come before the court 
in the future. In the words of Washington journalist, Joseph Kraft, Marshall qualified for the job only as 
“a Negro, not just any Negro, not even the best qualified Negro."53 Hearkening back to the days of racial 
slavery and Jim Crow in the South, Marshall was repeatedly called “lazy,” as “they” all were. Eastland 
tried to plant a troubling seed by linking Marshall’s name with communism. Thurmond suddenly 
became an astute constitutional scholar revealing his vast knowledge of the origins, prior law, legislative 
debates, writings and precedents contained in constitutional issues since 1790. Ervin, of course, was 
primarily interested in knowing the candidate’s judicial philosophy, although he seemed to be the lazy 
one, unwilling to read Marshall’s writings – or even ask his staff do its homework, instead demanding 
that the nominee indicate how he would vote in future Supreme Court cases.  
 
Part 5 – The Robert Bork Confirmation Hearings  
 Twenty years later, Ronald Reagan nominated Robert H. Bork to the court replacing retiring 
Justice Louis Powell. Bork’s name had been on Reagan’s short list since his first inaugural in 1981. The 
judge’s well-known and deeply conservative legal philosophy, and his hard-nosed opinions harshly 
criticizing several high court rulings of the Warren and Burger courts fused well with the president’s 
views. Reagan immediately “went public” to support his nominee (as defined by Johnson and Roberts in 
“Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process”) with speeches and remarks 
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emphasizing Bork’s brilliance as a legal and constitutional scholar, and his reputation as a fair-minded 
jurist. In his July 4, 1987 radio address to the nation Reagan said,  
Certainly freedom is something I had in mind this week when I nominated Judge Robert Bork… no 
appellate judge in America has a finer record. Not a single one of his more than 100 majority opinions has 
ever been reversed by the Supreme Court. To maintain the independence of the judiciary, I hope that we 
can keep politics out of the confirmation process…”54 
 
Reagan was obviously disingenuous in his comment about keeping politics out of the process. The 
president knew well before he announced the nomination that it would be highly political and 
controversial and would attract multitudes of politicians, legal scholars, and commentators on both sides.  
Reagan was willing to expend a tremendous amount of political capital with this nomination – he made 
at least 52 speeches and remarks – on behalf of this highly valued nominee.  At stake for Reagan was his 
chance to pack the court with legal conservatives who would show judicial restraint in all areas, except 
those rulings in the Warren and Burger courts expanding personal freedoms and protections under the 
Constitution. Reagan hoped that a strong justice like Bork would find a way to dismantle these recent 
laws. These issues included the right to privacy found in the Griswold v. State of Connecticut precedent 
which in turn resulted in the Roe v. Wade decision; expansion of equal protection and due process rights, 
and protection against self-incrimination, found in the 5th and 14th amendments and articulated in the 
Miranda cases; and civil rights that guaranteed voting rights (freedom from poll taxes, for example); 
anti-discrimination legislation in employment, housing, and various other areas of American life. 
Reagan was not devoted to theoretical constructs of judicial philosophy. Cloaked in an aura of 
presidential power, he was interested only in removing government interference in individual freedom 
and to unleash corporate power from strangulating regulation. The purpose of the government from his 
perspective was to buttress military might as the world’s greatest country, and to apply the vast power of 
the state to police criminals, indigents, and other lower forms of humanity. 
 Reagan’s remarks in August 1987 to a group of law enforcement officers gathered in Los 
Angeles demonstrated his law and order theme:  
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Judge Bork believes that judges should not make the laws; their function is to interpret the laws based on 
the Constitution and precedent. It's time we reassert the fundamental principle of the purpose of criminal 
justice is to find the truth, not to coddle criminals.55 
 
Throughout Reagan’s campaign for Bork he repeated the urgent need to place on the court a justice who 
would stand up for the rights of citizens, and in particular, the children of America against “ridiculous” 
decisions that allowed criminals to go free because of legal technicalities. Reagan’s comments during 
and following the Bork hearings expressed his utter disdain for those senators who distorted the judge’s 
record for purely partisan reasons. Even after it was clear that Bork would not receive the required 
number of votes for confirmation, Reagan refused to quit, “in the face of a lynch mob.”  In his final 
analysis, “the confirmation process became an ugly spectacle, marred by distortions and innuendos, and 
casting aside the normal rules of decency and honesty.”56 These unfounded attacks nonetheless fanned 
the flames of extreme rhetoric leading to a sharply divisive national conversation. 
 Journalist Jeffrey Rosen, in an article published in The New Republic in August, 2008, wrote his 
opinion of the hearings in 1987. His version was diametrically opposite to Reagan’s analysis. Rosen had 
worked for the senate judiciary committee as an intern in the fall of 1987, and witnessed Senator Joe 
Biden’s restraint during the hearings. The senator focused all questioning towards those fundamental 
issues central to the debate, “rather than demoniz[ing] him by conflating his personal and judicial views 
or trolling for private indiscretions.”57 Biden’s welcome to Bork and opening statements on September 
15th were certainly gracious, and laid the groundwork for a mutually respectful debate in the hours and 
days ahead.  He noted that the confirmation process would be best served 
…if we hear each other out and use this unique opportunity to educate ourselves and the American people 
about your record and what it may mean to the Supreme Court and to the future of this country we both 
love. Our respect for you, the majesty of our Constitution and the greatness of the American people 
require no less.58 
 
 An early line of questioning by Biden focused on a Supreme Court ruling from 1948, Shelly v. 
Kraemer, a civil rights case in which the high court struck down a state’s enforcement of a restrictive 
private covenant which kept citizens from owning property because of race. Relying on the 14th 
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amendment, the majority opinion held that while voluntary covenants among individuals were legal, 
using the force of the state to enforce these private covenants violated the equal protection clause.  Bork 
had been very critical of this opinion in the past. Biden queried if the judge considered this one of the 
many rulings that the Supreme Court got wrong and that the judge would have no trouble in overturning, 
according to statements he made in January 1987 before the Federalist Society. Bork responded that, 
although he was opposed to racial covenants in the law, the court’s 1948 decision broadened the civil 
rights provisions in the 14th amendment to a degree far beyond the rights articulated by the framers of 
the Constitution. Therefore the justices had over-reached their prerogative in this case, and should have 
found another way to strike down instances of racial discrimination.59 At the same time, Bork 
backtracked from the idea of disturbing settled law, and overruling long-held precedents.  
 Biden and Bork then discussed the court’s ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut, another supreme 
court opinion with which Bork disagreed. Biden noted that Bork had written critically about this 
decision beginning as far back as 1971 and as recently as July 1987. Both agreed that the Connecticut 
law was “nutty,” but Bork, once again, disagreed with the author’s opinion. He disapproved of how 
Justice William O. Douglas derived rights that were not textually available in the Constitution.  Biden 
quoted from an article the judge had written in 1971 and a lively exchange followed: 
Biden: you said that the right of married couples to have sexual relations without fear of unwanted 
children is no more worthy of constitutional protection by the courts than the right of public utilities to be 
free of pollution control laws. You argued that the utility company's right or gratification, I think you 
referred to it, to make money and the married couple's right or gratification to have sexual relations 
without fear of unwanted children, as "the cases are identical." 
 
Bork: I was making the point that where the Constitution does not speak—there is no provision in the 
Constitution that applies to the case— then a judge may not say, ‘I place a higher value upon a marital 
relationship than I do upon an economic freedom.’ Only if the Constitution gives him some reasoning. 
Once the judge begins to say economic rights are more important than marital rights or vice versa, and if 
there is nothing in the Constitution, the judge is enforcing his own moral values, which I have objected to. 
 
Biden: Then I think I do understand it, that is, that the economic gratification of a utility company is as 
worthy of as much protection as the sexual gratification of a married couple, because neither is mentioned 
in the Constitution. 
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It should be noted that, while this discussion was energetic, the tenor of the debate was calm and not at 
all contentious, unlike many of the interchanges between conservative senators and Thurgood Marshall 
in 1967.60  
 While the largest majority of members on the judiciary committee asked questions relating to 
Bork’s judicial philosophy and his opinions on constitutional law, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-
OH) questioned Bork about the political motivations of the then solicitor general’s role in firing special 
prosecutor Archibald Cox during the ‘Saturday Night Massacre’ on October 20, 1973.   Metzenbaum 
recalled that, according to the terms regulating the role of the special prosecutor to investigate wrong-
doing in the Watergate scandal, “which had the terms and force of the law,” prohibited the White House 
from firing Cox, unless he was found guilty of “extraordinary improprieties.” The senator further 
recalled that: 
Metzenbaum: The court in Nader v. Bork stated, "The firing of Archibald Cox in the absence of a finding 
of extraordinary impropriety was in clear violation of an existing Justice Department regulation having 
the force of law and was, therefore, illegal." So when you say it was not, you are saying that the court's 
decision meant nothing… ‘The Supreme Court,’ said the court [in the Nader v. Bork opinion], has twice 
held that an executive department may not discharge one of its own officers in a manner inconsistent with 
its own regulation concerning such discharge." 
 
Judge BORK: I did not say it meant nothing. I think it is wrong.61 
 
A lengthy debate followed this exchange in which Bork argued that he was in essence constitutionally 
correct in following Nixon’s executive order.  Metzenbaum then spoke about the chilling effect Bork’s 
actions in 1973 and his rationalizations of it could have on the judicial branch of the country if he were 
to become a justice of the supreme court: 
…the thing that concerns me, Judge Bork, and I think probably concerns millions of Americans, 
is that you are up for confirmation to be a member of the highest court of the land; a court determined that 
your action was illegal; you disagree with that position. But I wonder whether or not every American may 
not say, "Well, I can commit an illegal act also and it is not so bad because a member of the Supreme 
Court of the United States committed an illegal act and he disagreed with it, and I disagree with the act 
that convicted me," or whatever, in connection with some particular matter in which an individual is 
involved.62 
 
 By choosing which laws or regulations to abide by, and rejecting others, Bork could undermine 
the entire criminal and civil judicial systems and the rule of law in the country, which he repeatedly 
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argued, formed the basis of American society.  Bork testified during this line of questioning that he 
played no part in the Saturday night massacre other than firing the then special prosecutor, and then 
ascending to the role of assistant attorney general following the resignations of Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson, and Assistant Attorney General, William Ruckelshaus. Nor did the judge participate, he 
said, in helping Nixon’s preparations to defend the claim of executive privilege in refusing to release the 
White House tapes. At this point the hearings paused, as Metzenbaum distributed to the committee and 
the candidate correspondence from as early as August 1973 between Bork, White House Chief of Staff, 
Alexander Haig, and Bork’s close friend and the Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Charles L. Black, Jr.  
Professor Black had written an article which he sent to Bork, several days before it was published in the 
New York Times providing a constitutional rationale for upholding the claim of executive privilege in 
refusing to comply with Cox’s request for the tapes.   
 On August 3, 1973 Bork forwarded Black’s arguments to Haig who then sent them on to Nixon 
for his review with the comment that, “It is also significant that Bob Bork has reversed his originally 
skeptical attitude on our position.” The correspondence showed how Bork dissembled at this point in the 
confirmation hearings, in defining his role when he, in essence, changed from being the attorney for the 
United States government, into a partisan representing the president’s interests.63  It has only been 
divulged very recently (in February 2013) that, at the time of the so-called massacre, Nixon promised 
Bork the next seat on the Supreme Court for carrying out the president’s bidding.64 Once again it should 
be noted that, while strongly disagreeing with Bork on his political motivations in August and October, 
1973, Metzenbaum remained courteous and respectful towards the nominee. 
 Even when senators asked sensitive, even accusatory, questions no tempers flared and the 
discourse continued in an orderly, respectful manner.  A good example was when Senator Paul Simon 
(D-IL), who had recently re-read the Dred Scott opinion authored by Justice Taney, remarked that 
Taney’s argument that no one could read into the Constitution what is not there, sounded, “an awful lot 
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like Robert Bork.”  Bork took that remark, “a little hard,” but went on to explain that the concept of due 
process in Taney’s time was so nebulous that Taney could justify his decision. Taney argued instead that 
the clause would be violated by taking a black slave from a white owner, on the grounds of economic 
and private property rights guaranteed in the Constitution.65 Simon’s continuing concern about the Bork 
nomination remained in the judge’s strict constructionist approach to the language in the document, and 
particularly, in the 14th amendment. Simon believed that the court should not be rigid in its definition of 
liberty and that it must protect freedom against “substantial, arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints.”66 
 Throughout the hearings Bork’s testimony was much less consistent than his writings, opinions, 
and speeches, even recent ones. On numerous occasions he prevaricated in his responses to questioning, 
making statements such as, “Oh well, I was just trying to start a debate on this issue by stating a radical 
position,” and “If I don’t agree with law now, check back when I next encounter it.” He denied the 
implications of several of his writings because they were merely academic exercises, and suggested that 
“My views have changed,” on the freedom of speech, for example. Bork described several times how his 
understanding of the law, justice and the Constitution had evolved and grown over the many years as a 
professor and as a judicial representative.  
 When Bork was questioned by Senator Howell Heflin (R-AL) regarding his views on 
maintaining precedent-setting rulings and stare decisis, and how his position might affect decisions such 
as Roe v. Wade, Senator Thurmond interjected, “Mr. Chairman, it seems to me he is bordering now on a 
question asking him to express an opinion on a matter that may come before the Supreme Court and I 
would think that would be improper.” The rules for conducting confirmation hearings had apparently 
evolved in Senator Thurmond’s mind in the twenty years since the Marshall hearings when this 
exchange occurred: 
Thurmond: On March 7, 1870, the framer of the equal protection  clause said…that the equal protection 
clause required States to grant the equal protection of the law, not of its law, not of the law of the State, 
but of the law, the great law of the Republic…” …Do you believe that this statement is reconcilable with 
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Supreme Court cases banning discrimination in State law, and if so, how would you reconcile this 
statement with decisions forbidding discrimination in State laws rendered since 1954? 
 
Marshall:  Well, Senator, I would respectfully request that I not be asked to comment on broad general 
principles of law apparently or allegedly decided by the Supreme Court period. 
 
Thurmond: Well, probably you would not like for me to propound any question to you, but as an 
appointee by the President, I think as a Senator who has to advise and consent, I have a responsibility to 
do this.  
 
Marshall: I appreciate that Senator, and I respectfully request that you appreciate my position of not 
prejudging lawsuits before I am sent them.67 
  
The tenor and types of questions asked of Bork by Thurmond, were also quite different in 1987, when 
each of the senator’s queries began with a compliment on some aspect of Bork’s qualifications and 
brilliance. The actual questions provided the nominee with an opportunity to expand upon the neutrality 
of his judicial philosophy, his strong record in civil rights cases, and his willingness to respect supreme 
court precedents as settled law. On speaking of the possibility of un-enumerated rights in the 
Constitution, Bork defended himself against critics who accused him of denying a broader notion of 
rights, such as privacy, and due process, with the following exchange: 
Thurmond:  Judge Bork, yesterday, in response to a question, you indicated that there are some rights that 
are not enumerated in the Constitution, but are recognized because of the structure of the Constitution and 
government. Could you give us an example of one of these. 
 
BORK. Well, the right to travel, I think, Senator, was first derived—I have not re-read the case, recently, 
but I remember, it is in Crandall v. Nevada, a couple of years before the 14th amendment was ratified. 
Nevada was taxing people a dollar every time they left the State, and the Supreme Court struck down that 
tax in saying there was a right to travel without hindrance by the State, and it did so on structural 
reasoning about the nature of the Federal Union, and how you have to travel, and so forth.68 
 
Although Bork did not agree with those who found rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection 
in the Bill of Rights, he did acknowledge the freedom of citizens to travel around the country, a small 
and insignificant concession towards those who have dedicated themselves to pursue civil and personal 
rights for all American citizens. 
 When it was Senator Patrick Leahy’s turn to query the nominee, he began by remarking that he 
and his staff, (unlike the seemingly lazy Senator Ervin in 1967) had spent the entire month of August 
1987, up at his home in Vermont, studying Bork’s writings, opinions, and speeches. Leahy had also 
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employed his staff to brief him on Bork’s work, both written and spoken,  over time. At the end of this 
grueling investigation into the nominee’s history, Leahy confessed that he could not find any “growth” 
in Bork’s philosophy over time, or even serious re-consideration of early views in the 1960’s and 
1970’s. Leahy began with an article Bork had authored for the Indiana Law Review in 1971, entitled, 
“Neutral principles and Some First Amendment Problems.” After confirming with Bork that this article 
formed the judge’s most comprehensive articulation of his constitutional beliefs, Leahy addressed that 
section of the article in which Bork defined free speech. He argued that the freedom of speech 
guaranteed in the 1st amendment explicitly pertained to only political speech, not scientific, literary 
and/or other forms of expression which could include pornography or obscenity. In regard to this 
argument, Leahy noted how, as recent as 1986 Bork had remarked in front of a forum of the 
conservative interest group, the Federalist Society, at Stanford University, “I have been confirmed twice 
now, and I have had to eat that article page by page both times… that was a bit of hyperbole. But I have 
eaten selected paragraphs of that article. This is one right here that you point to that I guess I am going 
to eat again."69 As this particular discussion ended Bork’s contemporary view was unclear – in his 
discourse with Leahy, he equivocated his original position that the first amendment covered only 
political speech, but the only other kind of speech he could remember was his application of the first 
amendment protection of commercial speech in, for example, television advertisements promoting 
tobacco projects. Leahy then attempted a chronological history of the evolution of Bork’s philosophy. 
Once again the judge vacillated, saying that he had first argued against the Brandenburg precedent in 
which anti-American speech that was not designed to, or was unlikely to incite people to engage in 
unlawful behaviors was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. But depending on the 
circumstances Bork might or might not have, agreed with Brandenburg,  depending on the interpretation 
of the following rambling caveat in response to Leahy asking whether or not he supported the opinion in 
his September 16, 1987 testimony: 
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Well, there is obviously a question of how much chance you are willing to take. Now, if you have speech 
advocating violence or forcible overthrow of the Government, it is possible to say we will take a chance 
and, unless the imminent danger of violence or something of that sort is here, we will protect the speech 
that is also possible to say, and at the time I was thinking about and had discussed with Bickel, the fact—
relied upon by Holmes in his Gitlow opinion—the fact that we tend to think that some of these folks are 
insignificant and I suppose in America they are. But I was thinking about the fact that I knew of another 
nation where funny little men in raincoats, wearing mustaches, were standing on the corner advocating 
forcible overthrow and nobody took them seriously and we got a Nazi regime. I do not think that is a real 
problem in America, so I think we can afford to have a wide first amendment protection of the sort that 
Brandenburg supplies.  
 
LEAHY. Well, let me go back to another question and obviously you are going to have a chance to see 
the notes and transcripts of this and if you thought you did not get a chance to answer something fully, 
naturally we will go back to it. But, have you ever before made a statement that you felt Hess and 
Brandenburg was right? 
 
Judge BORK. Not in public.  
 
Senator LEAHY. I would rather stick with Brandenburg because I had understood your view of 
Brandenburg differently than the way you had expressed it today. 
 
Judge BORK. Well, I have had a different view of it from time to time, but I had a view as broad as 
Brandenburg before I wrote this article, when I was still teaching that course in constitutional  theory with 
Bickel, I had an enormously broad view of the amendment.70 
 
  
Part 6 - Conclusion 
 If the Bork hearings in the fall 1987 signaled a radical departure from the “norm” in confirmation 
hearings up until that time, they were indeed very different from the contentious and heated arguments 
in the Rehnquist hearings for Chief Justice just a year before. While politics had entered the Bork 
process, it was primarily focused on on the judge’s behavior during the Saturday Night Massacre in 
1973, when Bork illegally fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, and his behavior in helping Nixon 
prove his right to use executive privilege to deprive the Watergate investigation of listening to tapes of 
Nixon’s role in the scandal.  
 The Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings on Robert H. Bork, were also very different than 
those held twenty years earlier for the candidate Thurgood Marshall. Everyone in both parties on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee who made statements and participated in the interrogation of Bork praised 
his brilliance as a legal scholar, his success as a judge and his vast knowledge of the Constitution and 
historical precedents. The Marshall hearings were  in glaring contrast in 1967, as a current of overt 
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racism ran throughout the process and as the judge’s intelligence, education and qualifications were 
questioned (as was his perceived “laziness”). The abstruse and irrelevant questioning of Senator 
Thurmond provided virtually no revelatory insight into Marshall’s philosophy. Thurmond’s biting 
tongue, “Did you understand the question,” asked multiple times with contempt and sarcasm, ultimately 
failed to scare the unflappable Marshall. It was ironic that Eastland would try to apply the label of 
Marshall as a communist, since, of all the civil rights leaders from the 1940’s onward, he was the one 
who stood tallest on the rule of law. When others counseled peaceful non-violent resistance, or later the 
need to take up arms in defense against the brutality of the state, Marshall knew that the Constitution 
itself could provide the people with their civil rights and freedoms, if applied with a clear and thorough 
understanding of the framers’ intent. Ervin’s attempts to determine the position Marshall would take if 
on the court on the myriad cases coming forward in light of the Miranda rulings, were frustrated in the 
same manner as were Thurmond’s. 
 The Bork hearings were free from ad hominum attacks on the nominee’s character. Despite 
urging from special interest groups, Biden refused to allow personal attacks on the candidate or his 
family to intrude upon the proceedings. Comity obtained in the hearing room throughout the several 
days of hearings and debates which followed, and convivial laughter was plentiful at certain points. 
Republican senators on the committee allowed Bork to expound his beliefs and rulings, with no issues of 
time constraints or limits being raised by anyone during the thirty hours of testimony. Senator Biden 
graciously allowed all of the judge’s supporters to be heard and to testify, while he limited the number 
of left-leaning groups who vociferously opposed this nomination. Every Democratic senator of the 
committee asked fair questions, did not badger the candidate, said repeatedly said that if Bork needed 
anything – including the documents from which the senators culled their questions, that day’s hearing 
would be suspended until his needs were met. If Bork did not recall something he had written or 
expressed publicly, the senators were content with moving on to another issue or question.  
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 The Bork confirmation proceedings were long and at times tedious, but did not incite the media 
frenzy that occurred outside of the hearing room, often following Reagan’s rants against Democratic 
senators. While disagreements among the participants were, in some instances, profound, they rarely 
strayed into emotional outbursts, or slander, or misrepresentations or diabolical distortions of Bork’s 
record (Senator Edward Kennedy’s outburst the day Reagan nominated Bork notwithstanding). The 
concerns of primarily Democratic senators centered on what they believed to be an extreme view – a 
radical and highly ideological view of the Constitution. They were concerned that, despite the judge’s 
testimony to the contrary, he would advance an activist court in dismantling settled law in the areas of 
privacy rights, due process and equal protections, and civil rights. Democratic senators would not take a 
chance, given the inconsistency of statements Bork made during the hearings, compared to statements 
made in other forums.  Several senators including Biden, Simon, and Leahy, argued during the debate 
that Bork was altering his deeply-held philosophy to appease the senate and win confirmation. They also 
believed that it was for these reasons that Reagan nominated Bork in the first place. Reagan’s rhetoric of 
accusing Democratic senators of forming a “lynch mob” against Bork, gave traction to extremists on the 
right who decided to alter political discourse in America by wantonly claiming, regardless of the 
truthfulness of these claims, that anyone who did not agree with their narrative was unpatriotic, anti-
American, and subversive.  Among his other accomplishments, Reagan hoped to leave a legacy on the 
court which would ultimately become like the Supreme Court is today: filled with conservative bench 
jurists with a scattering of moderates in the minority. Such a court has already ruled that corporations, 
associations, and even labor unions share the same freedom of speech protections as those granted to 
individual citizens in the first amendment of the Bill of Rights. In Citizens United, the court has 
broadened the rights found in the Constitution beyond what anyone could have imagined in 1987. Today 
the Senate does not have the imperial power that accrues to the executive branch of government, and it 
never has. Those political commentators who argued that the U. S. Republic was threatened because of 
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the ascendancy of legislative powers threatening those of the president, need only look to today’s broken 
legislative branch to calm their fears.  
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